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Despite growing interest among policymakers, there is no theory of independent fiscal institutions. The emerging literature on ""fiscal councils"" typically makes informal parallels with the theory of central bank independence, but a very simple formal example shows that such a shortcut is flawed. The paper then illustrates key features of a model of independent fiscal agencies, and in particular the need (1) to incorporate the intrinsically political nature of fiscal policy - which precludes credible delegation of instruments to unelected decisionmakers - and (2) to focus on characterizing

This paper discusses the role of fiscal institutions, including budget rules and non-partisan agencies, in enhancing fiscal discipline. A stylized model of fiscal policy illustrates that optimal institutions lack credibility unless the costs to bypass them are sufficiently high. To the extent that the deficit bias is related to electoral uncertainty, complete budgetary transparency and strong democratic accountability suffice to establish credibility. Under incomplete budgetary transparency, accountable governments may also use institutions as a signal of competence to increase their reelection chances, which in turn erodes the penchant for excessive deficits. In light of the theory, empirical tests of the effectiveness of rules and institutions are undertaken. Looking at data for the EU-15, the estimated positive impact of numerical fiscal rules indicators on the primary balance may suffer from a simultaneity bias (because disciplined governments may be more likely to adopt strict institutions). Instrumental variable estimates fail to detect any significant effect of rules on fiscal outcomes.

Institutions aimed at constraining policy discretion to promote sound fiscal policies are once again at the forefront of the policy debate. Interest in ?fiscal councils,? independent watchdogs active in the public debate, has grown rapidly in recent years. This paper presents the first cross-country dataset summarizing key characteristics of fiscal councils among IMF members. The data documents a surge in the number of fiscal councils since the crisis. It also illustrates that well-designed fiscal councils are associated with stronger fiscal performance and better macroeconomic and budgetary f

The paper explores the extent to which the pressure of debt service on other spending items may push governments to embark on fiscal consolidation beyond what is strictly necessary to secure solvency. The empirical analysis identifies thresholds of interest bill indicators beyond which governments appear to shift to policies aimed at durably curbing the debt trajectory. Hence, in the current context of high inherited public debts, countries experiencing rising borrowing costs and interest payments would be more likely to enact more aggressive fiscal consolidations than warranted by strict solv

Rules-based fiscal policy is under threat. Over the last two decades, it proved frustratingly complicated to strike the right balance between three essential properties of sound fiscal policy rules: simplicity, flexibility, and enforceability. Simplicity has been sacrificed to ensure that more contingent (i.e. flexible) rules remained enforceable. The resulting arrangements have failed to adequately guide fiscal policy, undermining formal compliance, and ultimately, popular and political support for rules. To mitigate the risk that countries abandon rules-based policymaking, we suggest downplaying enforceability—i.e. the role of formal sanctions through enforcement—and enhancing the reputational costs of breaching rules. At the limit, the rule could consist of a simple quantitative benchmark for a key fiscal indicator. To boost reputational effects, independent fiscal councils should focus on debunking the "fiscal alchemy", clearing the public debate from partisan smokescreens, and fostering popular support for sound fiscal policies.

Este documento retoma el estudio de la relación empírica entre la políticafiscal y la estabilidad macroeconómica. Nuestro supuesto básico es que, pordefinición, el funcionamiento de los estabilizadores automáticas deberíasiempre y en todas partes contribuir a una mayor estabilidad macroeconómica(producción y consumo). Sin embargo, dos hechos estilizados parecen estar endesacuerdo con esa predicción. En primer lugar, el efecto moderador de losestabilizadores automáticos parece haberse debilitado en las economíasavanzadas entre los años 1990 y 2006. En segundo lugar, los estabilizadoresautomáticos no parecen ser eficaces en las economías en desarrollo. Nuestroanálisis aborda estos enigmas aparentes por medio del análisis del papelambivalente del gobierno como un amortiguador e inductor de shocks sobrelos determinantes de la volatilidad macroeconómica en el tiempo. Losresultados proporcionan un fuerte apoyo a la opinión de que la estabilizaciónfiscal opera principalmente a través de los estabilizadores automáticos.Palabras clave: Estabilización Económica; Política Fiscal; Estabilidad FiscalClasificación JEL: E62; H6 AbstractThe paper revisits the empirical link between fi scal policy and macroeconomicstability. Our basic presumption is that by defi nition, the operationof automatic stabilizers should always and everywhere contribute to greatermacroeconomic stability (output and consumption). However, two stylizedfacts seem at odds with that prediction. First, the moderating effect of automaticstabilizers appears to have weakened in advanced economies betweenthe mid-1990s and 2006 (the end of our main sample). Second, automaticstabilizers do not seem to be effective in developing economies. Our analysisaddresses these apparent puzzles by accounting for the government's ambivalentrole as a shock absorber and a shock inducer for determinants ofmacroeconomic volatility over time. Results provide strong support for theview that fi scal stabilization operates mainly through automatic stabilizers.Keywords: Economic stabilization ; Fiscal policy ; Fiscal stability.JEL Classifi cation: E62; H6.

Este documento retoma el estudio de la relación empírica entre la políticafiscal y la estabilidad macroeconómica. Nuestro supuesto básico es que, pordefinición, el funcionamiento de los estabilizadores automáticas deberíasiempre y en todas partes contribuir a una mayor estabilidad macroeconómica(producción y consumo). Sin embargo, dos hechos estilizados parecen estar endesacuerdo con esa predicción. En primer lugar, el efecto moderador de losestabilizadores automáticos parece haberse debilitado en las economíasavanzadas entre los años 1990 y 2006. En segundo lugar, los estabilizadoresautomáticos no parecen ser eficaces en las economías en desarrollo. Nuestroanálisis aborda estos enigmas aparentes por medio del análisis del papelambivalente del gobierno como un amortiguador e inductor de shocks sobrelos determinantes de la volatilidad macroeconómica en el tiempo. Losresultados proporcionan un fuerte apoyo a la opinión de que la estabilizaciónfiscal opera principalmente a través de los estabilizadores automáticos.

The paper revisits the empirical link between fiscal policy and macroeconomic stability. Our basic presumption is that by definition, the operation of automatic stabilizers should always and everywhere contribute to greater macroeconomic stability (output and consumption). However, two stylized facts seem at odds with that prediction. First, the moderating effect of automaticstabilizers appears to have weakened in advanced economies betweenthe mid-1990s and 2006 (the end of our main sample). Second, automatic stabilizers do not seem to be effective in developing economies. Our analysisaddresses these apparent puzzles by accounting for the government's ambivalent role as a shock absorber and a shock inducer for determinants of macroeconomic volatility over time. Results provide strong support for theview that fiscal stabilization operates mainly through automatic stabilizers. ; Este documento retoma el estudio de la relación empírica entre la políticafiscal y la estabilidad macroeconómica. Nuestro supuesto básico es que, pordefinición, el funcionamiento de los estabilizadores automáticas deberíasiempre y en todas partes contribuir a una mayor estabilidad macroeconómica(producción y consumo). Sin embargo, dos hechos estilizados parecen estar endesacuerdo con esa predicción. En primer lugar, el efecto moderador de losestabilizadores automáticos parece haberse debilitado en las economíasavanzadas entre los años 1990 y 2006. En segundo lugar, los estabilizadoresautomáticos no parecen ser eficaces en las economías en desarrollo. Nuestroanálisis aborda estos enigmas aparentes por medio del análisis del papelambivalente del gobierno como un amortiguador e inductor de shocks sobrelos determinantes de la volatilidad macroeconómica en el tiempo. Losresultados proporcionan un fuerte apoyo a la opinión de que la estabilizaciónfiscal opera principalmente a través de los estabilizadores automáticos.